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ABSTRACT

Globalization of micro-chip fabrication has opened a new avenue of cyber-crime.
It is now possible to insert hardware Trojans directly into a chip during the manufacturing
process. These hardware Trojans are capable of destroying a chip, reducing performance
or even capturing sensitive data. To date, defensive methods have focused on detection
of the Trojan circuitry or prevention through design for security methods.
This dissertation presents a shift away from prevention and detection to a design
methodology wherein one no longer cares if a Trojan is present or not. The Randomized
Encoding of Combinational Logic for Resistance to Data Leakage or RECORD process is
presented in the first of three papers. This chip design process utilizes dual rail encoding
and Quilt Packaging to create a secure combinational design that can resist data leakage
even when the full design is known to an attacker. This is done with only a 2.28x-2.33 x
area increase and 1.7x-2.24x increase in power. The second paper describes a new
method, Sequential RECORD, which introduces additional randomness and moves to 3D
split manufacturing to isolate the secure areas of the design. Sequential RECORD is
shown to work with 3.75x area overhead and 4.5x power increase with a 3% reduction in
slack. Finally, the RECORD concept is refined into a Time Division Multiplexed (TDM)
version in the third paper, which reduces area and power overhead by 63% and 56%
respectively. A method to safely utilize commercial chips based on the TDM RECORD
concept is also demonstrated. This method allows the commercial chip to be operated
safely without modification at the cost of latency, which increases by 3.9x.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND
Since the proliferation of computerized electronics in the 1980’s, hackers have
been trying to gain unauthorized access to these personal computers or cause general
mischief by developing malicious software. This software is commonly known by many
names: computer virus, worm, Trojan, etc. With the integration of the internet into
everyday interactions the threat of a computer virus is a part of daily life. The defenses
are many and commercially available. Operating system patches to prevent virus exploits
are a regular occurrence. However, there is an underlying assumption common to all the
defenses against computer viruses, namely that the hardware running it is safe and
operating as intended.
In the early 2000’s, that paradigm was upended by the concept of malicious
hardware embedded into a chip at the time of manufacturing [1]. These hardware
Trojans, as they came to be known, became possible through the globalization of the
microchip industry. As the semiconductor technology became smaller and smaller the
cost of fabrication facilities became just that much greater. Only the largest
manufacturers could continue to operate and maintain modern facilities. This forced
most chip designers to outsource their designs to other, cheaper, countries. To
manufacture a chip, the complete design must be sent to the fabrication facility, usually in
a standard GDSII file format. The chip manufacturer then has an opportunity to alter the
design to suit their purposes, creating a hardware Trojan.
Hardware Trojans are generally broken out into two categories: reliability and
data leakage. The reliability Trojan aims to disrupt the overall function of the chip in

2

some way or to reduce its useful life [2, 3]. This can mean that the mean time to failure
(MTTF) is significantly reduced or that data is corrupted in some way, making the final
output meaningless. Initially the infected chips operate as expected, especially during
testing. The Trojan effects are triggered after some long period of time or after a rare
sequence of events occurs on chip.
Data leakage Trojans are more complicated and potentially more damaging. The
undetected loss of secret information can be devastating. These Trojans will not affect
the normal operation of chips. Instead, they scan and capture data, such as an encryption
key, as it is processed, or possibly allow privilege escalation on a CPU [4, 5]. The
captured data can be leaked out through Wi-Fi [6] or the power emissions could even be
harnessed [7]. Introduction of a data leaking Trojan is much more complex than a
reliability Trojan. The reliability of a chip can be compromised with little understanding
of the overall function of the design. Simply reducing some key wire widths so that
failure occurs prematurely or adding a counter to switch a line to ground will cause a chip
to fail in the field [2]. Conversely, a data leakage Trojan designer must have a near total
understanding of the circuit they wish to infect. Since the data leakage of confidential
information is so valuable the extra effort is warranted, so are extra defensive measures.
Data leakage Trojans will be the focus of this dissertation. Unless otherwise noted,
hardware Trojans will refer to the data leakage type in the following text.

1.2 TROJAN DEFENSES
Hardware designers can either try to detect the Trojan or prevent it. Detection of
hardware Trojans is extremely difficult, but efforts have been made to detect them.
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Runtime monitoring and post-manufacture testing [8] rely on identifying the differences
in chip operation introduced by the Trojan circuit. These methods depend on the tester’s
ability to trigger the Trojan circuit so the effects of the Trojan can be measured. Triggers
are intentionally designed so that testing is unlikely to uncover them, e.g. repeating the
same instruction hundreds of times. Once triggered, the effects can be obvious, such as
circuit malfunction, or can be subtle. Subtle changes to the chip’s operation can
sometimes be identified through side channels such as power, temperature, path delay or
EM emissions. Runtime monitoring and post manufacture testing usually rely on the
golden chip concept. The golden chip requirement is the Achilles heel of these methods.
Since the designers are outsourcing the design, the only place this chip can come from is
the same facility that produced the suspect chips in the first place. Simulations are not
typically accurate enough to detect subtle changes in side channel measurements.
A hardware engineer must then try to prevent the attacker from placing the Trojan
on chip using a Design for Security (DFS) method. The currently available methods all
try to accomplish the same goal, which is to prevent the attacker from understanding the
design. The idea being that if an attacker cannot understand what the chip is doing or
how it is laid out then there is no opportunity to find and leak data. Commonly available
methods include obfuscation, layout camouflaging and split manufacturing [9].
Obfuscation aims to make the function of the circuit less obvious by using nonstandard
designs for common functions. It also includes the technique of logic encryption where
the data processed or the function performed in a circuit is encrypted [10]. Obfuscation
can also be performed on state machines in the design, additional states are added leading
to dead ends or black hole states [9].
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Layout camouflaging attempts to disguise the design by making the layouts of
each gate indistinguishable from each other. For example, the layout of a NAND or
NOR cell can be made to look identical. Extracting the netlist using image based
techniques on the layout mask then becomes difficult [11, 12].
Finally, split manufacturing attempts to break up the design into front-end and
back-end layers. The front-end consists of the lower silicon layers and first metal layers.
The back-end being the remaining metal layers [13]. Splitting the fabrication prevents an
attacker in one location from having access to the complete design. This can be
extended to 3D ICs as well since the upper chip can naturally be manufactured
separately.
Unfortunately, all three methods have weaknesses. Obfuscation and layout
camouflaging can both be deciphered given enough effort and time spent to reverse
engineer the design files. Split manufacturing is susceptible when multiple production
runs are needed. An attacker could exploit industry standards in floorplaning, placement
and routing to alter one half of the split chip successfully [13] on the first run, or reverse
engineer a finished chip, which can be obtained through legitimate or illegitimate means,
and inserting attacks into subsequent production runs which are often needed to meet
demand [14].

1.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION
The research presented in the subsequent papers presents a new paradigm in
hardware Trojan defense. Using the following DFS methods to defend against data
leakage Trojans, designers no longer need to worry about detecting Trojans or even
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preventing them. The designers can simply ignore them. The first paper, RECORD,
presents a new method of designing a custom ASIC chip for defense. Randomized
Encoding of Combinational Logic for Resistance to Data Leakage (RECORD) describes
how a combinational logic design can be converted to a randomized dual rail circuit. The
encoding, in combination with a split manufacturing process called Quilt Packaging [11]
which splits the chip into secure and insecure portions, prevents an attacker from
capturing any meaningful data from any outsourced portion of the ASIC design. The
RECORD process is effective even if the design is fully known to an attacker and
maintains its effectiveness through any number of subsequent production runs. The
design is generic, allowing it to be used quickly and easily on any existing combinational
design. The only costs to the RECORD process are increased area and power, 2.28x2.33x and 1.7x-2.24x respectively in sample tests on an Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Substitution Box (SBox) design.
The second paper addresses the challenges of utilizing the RECORD process in a
sequential logic environment. By importing the RECORD process directly into a
sequential circuit, new vulnerabilities develop. Data is now available on multiple clock
cycles and a clever attacker could infer and decode the randomized dual rail signal. The
Sequential RECORD process introduces additional randomness into the dual rail
encoding along with additional randomness in the assembly of the final chip. No longer
will Quilt Packaging be used; instead 3D split manufacturing will take its place. Careful
segregation of the circuit components allows the lower tier of the 3D process to be
interchangeable with a large number of generic upper tiers. The Sequential RECORD
process ends up being more secure than RECORD with a far greater number of
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permutations available to the designer. Sequential RECORD is again generic and viable
across multiple production runs. The cost is again in increased area and power, 3.75x and
4.5x respectively, and a slight impact to performance of 3% reduction in slack in a
sample Data Encryption Standard circuit design.
The major weaknesses of RECORD and Sequential RECORD are addressed by
the third paper, namely the increased area and power and the reliance on ASIC designs.
Many if not most companies today rely on commercial of the shelf (COTS) products, not
their own custom designs. RECORD would be useless on a COTS chip as it stands. To
adapt the RECORD concepts to COTS chips and to address the high cost of area and
power, a Time Division Multiplexed (TDM) version of RECORD is introduced for both
combinational and sequential designs. It decreases the area overhead of sequential
RECORD by 63% and power by 56% at the cost of latency which increases by at least
5x. The TDM concept is then further refined to show how it can be used to operate a
COTS product from a second chip. The second chip could be an FPGA or CPU. The
COTS process is then proven out in real hardware which demonstrates the process and
the RECORD principles. The cost of the COTS process is in latency which increases by
3.9x. The RECORD method and its derivatives represent an entirely new way for both
the ASIC designer and the COTS integrator to protect their designs free from the worry
of data leakage from hardware Trojans.
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ABSTRACT

Many companies outsource manufacturing of their chips. Untrustworthy
manufacturers may add hardware Trojans which cause data leakage. Existing defensive
methods can be compromised if attackers can physically access the chip. A technique,
called RECORD (Randomized Encoding of COmbinational Logic for Resistance to Data
leakage) is proposed which uses Quilt Packaging and data randomization to prevent
attackers from interpreting data even when data leakage exists. Experiments on a 45 nm
8-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Substitution Box (Sbox) show RECORD can
effectively hide information with approximately 2.3x increase in area, 1.7x in dynamic
power and 1.06x in delay.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The ever-increasing cost of technology scaling has forced many design houses to
outsource their semiconductor fabrication process to lower cost facilities in other
countries. Chip manufacturing has become a global enterprise. Outsourcing presents a
problem when sensitive designs must be surrendered to the manufacturer before
production. These manufacturers may not have secure facilities or processes, and their
trustworthiness remains unknown. The opportunity exists for malicious parties, or
attackers, to re-engineer the original design and to insert malicious hardware known as
hardware Trojans.
The original functionality of the chip is maintained after Trojan insertion, with
little to no increase in area or power consumption, making it very difficult to detect the
attack during testing. At runtime, the Trojans are triggered externally or by a specific
sequence of internal signals.
Trojan circuits generally target reliability or data leakage. The reliability Trojan
aims to damage the chip in some way or otherwise make it non-functional [1-2]. These
Trojans can significantly reduce the mean time to failure (MTTF) or corrupt the data to
make the final output meaningless. Data leakage Trojans are more complicated and
potentially more damaging. They will not affect the normal operation of chips. Instead,
they scan and capture data or give an unauthorized user control of the system, for
example by leaking an encryption key or allowing privilege escalation [3]. The technique
proposed in this paper defends against data leakage Trojans.
Successful execution of a data leakage Trojan circuit relies on the attacker’s
ability to understand the chip design. This can be accomplished before fabrication by
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analyzing the netlist and layout, or afterwards by reverse-engineering a fabricated chip
from the open market [4]. Methods of combating hardware Trojans include runtime
monitoring, post-silicon testing [5] or design for security (DFS) [6]. Runtime monitoring
and post-silicon testing try to detect abnormal chip behaviors when hardware Trojans are
triggered. They are ineffective against data leakage Trojans which do not change the
chip’s behavior. DFS attempts to make it harder for the attacker to understand the design
through obfuscation, layout camouflaging, and split manufacturing [7]. Obfuscation aims
to make the function of the circuit less obvious by using nonstandard designs for common
functions or by adding states to state machines which lead to dead end or black hole
states [7]. Camouflaging attempts to disguise the design by making the layouts of each
gate indistinguishable, for example by making a NAND or NOR cell look identical, so
that extracting the netlist from the layout becomes difficult or impossible [7,8]. Split
manufacturing attempts to break up the design so that the lower silicon and metal layers
are manufactured with one company and the remaining metal layers with another [9],
preventing either fabricator access to complete design information. All three methods can
be compromised when an attacker procures a fabricated chip and reverse-engineers the
design. Hardware Trojans can then be designed and injected in the manufacturing
process.
A new technique is proposed which prevents leakage of useful data from an
established Hardware Trojan. This technique, called RECORD (Randomized Encoding of
COmbinational Logic for Resistance to Data leakage) [10], uses Dual-rail encoding to
randomize the information within the chip, and Quilt Packaging [11] to protect a small
portion of critical information that is needed to decode the data on-chip. This scheme
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prevents an attacker from interpreting leaked data, even if they have full access to the
outsourced design and data within the outsourced portion. Simulations of a 45 nm 8-bit
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Substitution Box (Sbox) show that RECORD can
effectively hide the information being processed while incurring an acceptable increase in
area, power, and delay.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dual
rail randomized encoding with Quilt Packaging for data leakage hardware Trojan
resistance. Design examples are discussed in Section 3. Concluding remarks are
presented in Section 4.
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2. FRAMEWORK OF RECORD

The basic framework to randomize the on-chip information in hardware is
discussed in Section 2.1. The utilization of Quilt Packaging is discussed in Section 2.2.
The associated vulnerability analysis is revealed in Section 2.3 and the design overhead is
discussed in Section 2.4.

2.1 RANDOMIZED ENCODING
The key idea of RECORD is to introduce randomness in information processing.
To accomplish this, non-overlapping codes are defined for logic values. To allow
randomness to be introduced, at least two bits (i.e. dual-rail logic) are needed to encode a
logic zero and logic one. The dual-rail combination 00 and 11 were defined to represent a
logical zero, and 01 and 10 to represent a one. One of the two rails will be generated from
a random number generator and will be held in the “secure” section of the chip. This rail
will be called the random rail. The second rail will contain a value which depends on the
single-rail logic value and the value on the random rail, and will be available to the inner
combinational logic.
Conversion between the single-rail logic and the corresponding dual-rail logic is
straightforward. Consider a single-rail binary logic value x. One of the dual rails will be
given a random logic value r. The other rail will be given a logic value, t, determined
from x and r as
t  xr.

(1)
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One must then know both r and t to determine x:
x = t Å r.

(2)

Protecting the data, x, from Hardware Trojans can then be accomplished by preventing
the attacker from accessing the value r on the random rail.
A simplistic implementation of the dual-rail approach is shown in Figure 2.1,
where each single-rail logic gate is replaced with a corresponding dual-rail gate. The
values of A and B correspond to the values of the data, x, and A1, A2, B1 and B2
correspond to the associated values of t and r. This dual-rail implementation requires an
unacceptable increase in area and power over the single-rail gate.

(d)
Figure 2.1. (a) A conventional AND gate; (b) The equivalent AND gate based on the
random encoding; (c) Its possible truth tables; and (d) One corresponding implementation
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To reduce overhead while maintaining the randomness needed for security, all the
gates in a combinational logic block can share the same random rail. Doing so allows use
of only one random number generator and allows the logic implementation to become
simpler.
With all input signals sharing the same random bit, any Boolean function
𝑓(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , … ) with x1, x2, x3 … as Boolean variables can be converted to the
corresponding dual-rail representation as
𝑓(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , … ) → (𝑓(𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , 𝑡3 , … ) ⊕ 𝑟)
= (𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥2 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥3 ⊕ 𝑟, … ) ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑟) = (𝑔, 𝑟)

(3)

where the dual-rail output is represented by r and g, where r is the random logic value on
the common random rail, g is the dual-rail representation of the function output, and
t1,t2,… are the logic values on the input dual rail corresponding to input signals x1, x2….,
respectively, i.e., 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖 ⊕ 𝑟, i . While calculation of g still seems complicated, it is
worthwhile to note the following logic equivalency which uses Shannon expansion.

𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥2 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥3 ⊕ 𝑟, … ) ⊕ 𝑟

(4)

= 𝑟𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 1, 𝑥2 ⊕ 1, 𝑥3 ⊕ 1, … ) ⊕ 1 +
𝑟̅ 𝑓 (𝑥1 ⊕ 0, 𝑥2 ⊕ 0, 𝑥3 ⊕ 0, … ) ⊕ 0
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
̅ , 𝑡2,
̅ 𝑡3̅ … ) + 𝑟̅ 𝑓(𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , 𝑡3 … )
= 𝑟𝑓(𝑡
1

(5)
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The dual-rail output of a function 𝑓(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , … ) can thus be determined from the values
of inputs t, the random rail r, and the combinational function 𝑓(∙) and can further be
implemented using a multiplexer (MUX) as shown in Figure 2.2.
Such a MUX-based implementation has an area and power overhead of
approximately 2x compared to the single-rail approach, and applies to any Boolean
function. In addition to reducing overhead, it has the benefit that the random signal r is
clearly separated from the rest of the calculation. As long as this signal and the final
MUX are hidden from the attacker, then the information obtained from any other portion
of the circuit cannot be directly decoded.

Figure 2.2. A MUX-based implementation of randomized dual-rail encoding scheme

RECORD can be implemented in various ways. For example, it is not necessary
to convert all the inputs to dual-rail. Changing just the first input, x1, of a function to dual
rail gives the same effect as converting all the inputs. The corresponding dual-rail
representation of a function f is as follows
𝑓(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , … ) → (𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , … ) ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑟)

(6)
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The first rail can be re-cast as

𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , … ) ⊕ 𝑟 =
(7)
𝑟𝑓((𝑥1 ⊕ 1, 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , … ) ⊕ 1 + 𝑟̅ 𝑓((𝑥1 ⊕ 0, 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , … ) ⊕ 0
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
̅1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , … ) + 𝑟̅ 𝑓(𝑡1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , … )
= 𝑟𝑓(𝑡

(8)

The MUX-based implementation is shown in Figure 2.3. In this figure, only input x1 is
converted to dual-rail representation (t1, r), and all the remaining inputs are single-rail.
The output g is also in dual-rail representation with the random rail r, (i.e., the final
single-rail logic value will be,𝑔 ⊕ r). Compared with the implementation in Figure 2.2,
this implementation will result in different power and area overhead as shown by the
design examples in Section 3.

Figure 2.3. An alternative implementation of the randomized dual-rail encoding scheme
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For RECORD to be effective it must protect the random rail r as well as the final
MUX, such that any data obtained from elsewhere on the chip cannot be directly
interpreted. So long as this data is protected, the user cannot interpret the data obtained
from any other part of the circuit. The next section will explain how random rail and
MUX can be protected from hardware Trojans.

2.2 QUILT PACKAGING
To determine the meaning of data within the unsecure portion of the IC, the
attacker must know the value of r. To get this value, a hardware Trojan must monitor the
values of f and f’ and the output, g, of the MUX in Figures 2.2 or 2.3, so that r can be
inferred, or must directly monitor the random rail. These values can be protected using
Quilt Packaging [12-14]. Quilt Packaging allows two dies of different sizes and
technologies to be fabricated separately and then joined. The process creates a highspeed, low-loss connection with measured insertion losses of only 1 dB at 110 GHz and
2.25dB at 220 GHz [13]. The dies can be attached using several methods including Sn
immersion plating and pin transfer of solder paste [14].
To utilize Quilt Packaging, the RECORD design can be partitioned so that a
secure area of the chip input/output (I/O) is designed and fabricated separately. The
secure I/O area includes the random number generator, the XOR gates for conversion
between single-rail and dual-rail, and the output selection MUXes. These components
require a small area relative to the remainder of the design. The two dies can then be
combined using Quilt Packaging in a trusted facility. An illustration of the layout
partition is shown in Figure 2.4, where x1 is converted to dual-rail (t1, r), and the output is
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converted back to single rail using the same random rail r. The random bit would not
exist anywhere on the outsourced die, thus prohibiting direct monitoring of this bit’s
value.
Consider the fact that these I/O elements are replicated many times for each
design, once for every input and output bit, and are interchangeable between designs. It
is then possible to pre-fabricate them as standardized circuits in a secure facility for
universal applications (as long as the locations of the I/O’s are pre-defined as a standard).
Figure 2.5, shows an example layout. The random number generator is shown in red, as
is the random rail. Note that these modules and the layout pattern are independent of the
combinational function being implemented, or the number of inputs that are converted to
dual-rail. RECORD envisions that these circuits would just need to be fabricated once for
many different designs. For instance, the design in Figure 2.4 can now be generated by
one random number generator module, one dual-rail input module, and one output
module.

Figure 2.4. Partition of layout for Quilt Packaging
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2.3 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
RECORD was developed to eliminate vulnerabilities that might occur when an
attacker adds a hardware Trojans to a chip for the purpose of leaking privileged
information from the IC in the final product. RECORD protects against such Trojan’s by
ensuring the outsourced chip is never given information about the random bit. The
random rail and the random number generators are pre-fabricated for universal
applications and incorporated into the outsourced design through Quilt Packaging. The
attacker has no access to the random data. They will only see the “randomized” inputs, ti,
and that the outsourced portion of the chip yields two outputs, f and f’. The attacker will
know that one of the outputs is correct, but will not know which. Simply choosing one of
the outputs f or f' at random would not generate any meaningful results. To decode the
output, which is itself a dual rail signal, the chosen signal would need to be XOR'd
against the inaccessible random bit.

Figure 2.5. Example of Quilt Packaging Layout. The random number generator and
random rail are shown in red. The center core can be safely outsourced. The smaller dies
on the periphery are pre-fabricated securely and used interchangeably
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While RECORD does not allow the outsourced chip access to information about
the random bit, and thus prevents an attacker from identifying useful information within
the outsourced design, there are other side channels that might assist attackers in
obtaining protected information. One important type of side channel attacks is the power
analysis attack, including differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power
analysis (CPA) [15-16]. These methods rely on the subtle power difference between a 0
to 1 transition and a 1 to 0 transition of a logic gate, and allow an attacker to guess the
data operated on within the IC.
RECORD is naturally resistant to DPA or CPA attacks, since it uses a dual-rail
encoding scheme with uniform switching, which hides asymmetries in data processing.
The power usage difference between data input patterns in a RECORD design is much
smaller than in a conventional design so that a stronger resistance to power analysis
attacks can be achieved. Specifically, through randomized encoding (i.e., with 0 being
coded as 00 and 11, and 1 being coded as 10 and 01, each with equal probability), the
number of wires with a 01 or a 10 switching in the entire circuit is nearly identical,
regardless of the number of logic blocks with a true or false output. The total power
consumption reveals little to no information about the processed data.

2.4 OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
The protections afforded by RECORD comes at the cost of an approximately 2x
overhead in power and area as each function must be implemented twice, and there are
additional costs associated with Quilt Packaging. More accurate data is reported in
Section 3, which includes the XOR gates and the random number generator needed for
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the conversion between single-rail and dual-rail representations. As should be expected,
as the size of the design increases, the overhead will get closer to 2x as the number of
components in the protected portion of the design become small compared with the
overall design. A 2x overhead is still smaller than many of the existing techniques for
reliability enhancement, such as the triple modular redundancy (TMR) [17], and is a cost
that should be expected to achieve enhanced security. A 2x overhead should be
acceptable for many security applications, where concerns about area and power are
usually secondary to the need for trusted hardware.
In addition to power and area, there is also some overhead due to added
processing delays. There is minimal difference in the timing of the combinational logic
required by the two rails compared to the timing in the original design. Additional delay
may be introduced by the inverters that generate the dual-rail inputs and the MUXes at
the output, but the added delay should be small compared with the delay of the overall
combinational logic block. This assertion will be demonstrated in the design examples in
Section 3.
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3. DESIGN EXAMPLES

To demonstrate the capabilities and overhead associated with RECORD in real
designs, an 8-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Substitution Box (Sbox) was
implemented with RECORD. The AES Sbox was implemented with the same structure as
described in [18]. The random bit is generated using a Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR) [19], though any valid random number generator would work equally well. The
design was synthesized using the FreePDK 45 nm process [20] and Cadence Encounter
RTL Compiler v.13.10 to obtain power, area and timing data. One example was then laid
out using Cadence Encounter RTL to GDSII v.13.23.
As an illustration of functionality, for RECORD with two inputs converted to dual
rail, Figures 3.1 - 3.6 show a series of waveforms for the AES Sbox design. Figure 3.1
shows output bit 3, chosen at random, from the standard AES Sbox. Figure 3.2 shows a
randomly selected internal signal from RECORD design. The Figure 3.3 waveform
shows the corresponding internal signal from the duplicated function block, F’, of the
RECORD design. Note the waveforms in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 are not equal as
expected, and even if the values in the two waveforms were identical, it is not possible to
infer the corresponding logic value unless the random bit is known. Figure 3.4 and 3.5
show the third output bits from each of the two function blocks, F and F’. These are still
encoded with the random bit. Finally, Figure 3.6 shows the final bit 3 output of the
record process after choosing between 3.4 and 3.5. Note Figure 3.6 is identical to 3.1 as
expected.
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Figure 3.1. Output bit 3 from standard AES Sbox

Figure 3.2. Internal signal from first function block, F, of RECORD designed Sbox

Figure 3.3. Same internal signal as in Figure 8b but from second function block, F’, of
RECORD designed Sbox

Figure 3.4. Output bit 3 from first function block, F, before demuxing
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Figure 3.5. Output bit 3 from second function block, F’, before demuxing

Figure 3.6. Top waveform is a repeat of 8a, standard Sbox output bit 3. Bottom
waveform is the final output bit 3 from a RECORD Sbox

Since a designer has the option to choose which inputs are converted to dual rail
there are 256 possible designs for the 8-bit AES Sbox. All 256 possibilities have been
implemented for comparison of power, area and delay. The increase in total area is
shown in Figure 3.7. This figure displays the area for each of the 256 possible design
variations sorted by the number of bits converted to dual rail. First one bit then two and
so on until all bits are converted to dual rail. As expected the area slowly increases as
more bits are converted to dual rail, with the most area efficient designs using only one
input converted to dual rail and the designs using the most area converting all bits to
dual-rail. It is important to note, however, that there is only a 2% difference between the
most and least area efficient designs. The most efficient design, one input bit converted

25

to dual rail, shows a 2.28x increase in area over the standard non-RECORD sbox.
Whereas converting all inputs to dual rail shows only 2.33x area increase. The
differences in area result primarily from the added inverters at the inputs and MUXs at
the outputs, not from a significant change in the size of the logic.

Layout Area, µ2

1840
1830
4Bits

1820
1810

2Bits

5Bits

6bits

7Bits

3Bits

1800
1790

Dual Rail Input Bit Combinations

Figure 3.7. Layout area for each possible input dual rail combination, sorted by number
of bits converted to dual rail

Figure 3.8 shows the leakage power for all combinations of converted bits, sorted
in the same manner as Figure 3.7. A 2.3x increase in leakage power is shown for three of
the design options: when bits (7,5,4,3,2), bits (7,5,2,1,0) and bits (5,4,3,2,0) are converted
to dual rail. These combinations represent the smallest increase in leakage power. The
largest increase in leakage power (2.34x) is found when bits (7,6,5,4,2) are converted to
dual rail. Interestingly, both the least and largest increases are found with five bits
converted to dual rail. Figure 3.9 shows a similar plot for dynamic power. The least
dynamic power increase (1.7x) is found when bits (7,6,5,4,2) are converted which is also
the option with the largest leakage power. The largest dynamic power increase of 2.24x
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is found for the design option where bits (7,6,4,0) are converted. Finally, Figure 3.10
shows the increase in critical path delay for each design option organized as in the
previous tables. The standard Sbox delay was found to be 2.3 us. The delay increases by
only 1.06x or 137ps for the option where bits (7,5,2) are converted to dual rail and by
1.12x or 291ps for the option where bits (3,0) are converted. Table 3.1, summarizes these

Leakage Power, nW

impacts.
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4Bits

5Bits

6Bits
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9000
Dual Rail Input Bit Combinations

Dynamic Power, nW

Figure 3.8. Leakage power for each possible input dual rail combination, sorted by
number of bits converted to dual rail
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Figure 3.9. Dynamic power for each possible input dual rail combination, sorted by
number of bits converted to dual rail
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Figure 3.10. Increase in critical path delay for each possible input dual rail combination,
sorted by number of bits converted to dual rail

Table 3.1 Summary of RECORD overhead impact
Area, µm2
Dynamic, nW
Leakage, nW Delay, ps
Baseline

788

RECORD 2.28x-2.33x

115169

4305

2311

1.7x-2.24x

2.3x-2.34x

.06x-.12x

Overhead

It is also worthwhile to point out that since the different dual rail options are all
equally secure. The Quilt Packaging process and the pre-fabricated I/O modules allow the
individual final chips to be assembled differently each time. For example, the first chip
could have the first input bit converted and the next could have all input bits converted
and so on. Thus preventing any reverse engineering attempts from being successful and
greatly frustrating any potential attacker.
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Figure 3.11 shows an example layout of the RECORD design with all inputs
converted to dual-rail. We only demonstrate the portion that can be outsourced (i.e., the
core in Figure 2.5). The layout of universal I/O elements is simple and not shown.

Figure 3.11. Layout of the RECORD design to be outsourced with all inputs converted to
dual rail
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

A novel scheme was proposed to prevent attackers from interpreting leaked data from
hardware Trojans by randomizing data within outsourced combinational logic and
providing “secure” chip areas with the aid of Quilt Packaging. Simulation results on a 45
nm 8-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Substitution Box (Sbox) showed that
RECORD can randomize information and separate the dual rail encoding/decoding with a
2.28x-2.33x increase in area, a 1.7x-2.24x increase in dynamic power and an 1.06x-1.12x
increase in delay. This overhead can be considered necessary to achieve enhanced
security in sensitive applications. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first
circuit-level technique that can resist data leakage after hardware Trojans are established.
The technique is particularly suitable for secure designs with multiple fabrication runs
[21].
Experiments were conducted in the AES design to demonstrate the impact of
converting 1 or all 8 bits of the design to dual-rail, or any combination in between. For
this logic circuit, there was negligible difference among the area, power usage, or delay
added by any of the 256 possible designs.
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ABSTRACT

Globalization of micro-chip fabrication has opened a new avenue of cyber-crime.
It is now possible to insert hardware Trojans directly into the chip during the
manufacturing process. These hardware Trojans are capable of destroying a chip,
reducing performance or even capturing sensitive data. This paper presents a
modification to a recently presented method of Trojan defense known as RECORD:
Randomized Encoding of COmbinational Logic for Resistance to Data Leakage.
RECORD aims to prevent data leakage through a randomized encoding and split
manufacturing scheme. Its weakness, however, it that it is only applicable to
combinational circuits. Sequential RECORD proposes a method to extend RECORD
concepts to sequential designs. Experimental work with Sequential RECORD on a Data
Encryption Standard circuit show that it is effective with the cost of a 3.75x area
overhead, 4.5x power overhead and only a 3% decrease in performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the century many IC design houses have outsourced the
production of their chips to other countries [1]. This has created a new opening for
cyber-attacks. When a firm sends out a sensitive design to be manufactured overseas, the
trustworthiness of the manufactured IC can no longer be guaranteed. Hardware Trojans
can be injected into the netlist or the layout altered to perform a variety of malicious
activities. There are generally two types of hardware Trojans: reliability Trojans that stop
the chip from functioning or data capture Trojans that capture the data being processed by
the chip [2]. A reliability hardware Trojan is placed on chip with the goal of damaging
the chip at some later, unexpected, date. For example, adding a simple circuit to increase
power consumption [3] rendering the system un-usable in the field or a counter that
counts down to switching the whole circuit off [4].
After fabrication, the Trojan circuit remains dormant during testing. The Trojan
is usually very small relative to the remaining logic and therefore adds negligibly to the
area and power consumption of the final circuit while dormant. Current methods of
detecting hardware Trojans after production involve runtime monitoring and postmanufacture testing [5]. Runtime monitoring and post-manufacture testing rely on
identifying the differences in chip operation introduced by the Trojan circuit. These
methods depend on the tester’s ability to trigger the Trojan circuit so the effects of the
Trojan can be measured. The effects can be obvious, such as circuit malfunction, or
subtle. Subtle changes to the chip’s operation can sometimes be identified through side
channels such as power, temperature, path delay or EM emissions. Runtime monitoring
and post manufacture testing all rely on the golden chip concept. The golden chip
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requirement is the Achilles heel of these methods. The only place this chip can come
from is the same facility that produced the suspect chips in the first place. Simulations
are not typically accurate enough to detect subtle changes in side channel measurements.
Because of this problem design for security (DFS) [6] methods are more reliable.
For a data leakage Trojan to be successful the attacker needs to understand, at a
minimum, the logic that is being monitored. This information can be gleaned from the
netlist and layout or by obtaining a finished chip from a previous production run and
reverse engineering it [7]. These types of Trojans can leak sensitive encryption keys out
through Wi-Fi [8] or even through the power signature itself [9]. Current DFS methods
try to prevent the attacker from understanding what the circuit is doing through
obfuscation, layout camouflaging, or split manufacturing [10]. A new method, known as
the RECORD [11], takes this technique one step further by preventing the attacker from
understanding the meaning of logic signals.
Obfuscation [12], layout camouflaging [10,13] and split manufacturing[14] rely
on the inability of the attacker to see what has been done to disguise the circuit.
However, with enough time and effort obfuscation and layout camouflaging can be
deciphered. Split manufacturing breaks up the design into lowest level silicon and upper
level metals. The two pieces are manufactured separately preventing an attacker in one
location from having access to a complete design. Split Manufacturing can be overcome
by exploiting industry standards in floorplaning, placement and routing to alter one half
of the split chip successfully [14], or reverse engineer a finished chip, which can be
obtained through legitimate or illegitimate means, and inserting attacks into subsequent
production runs which are often needed to meet demand [15].
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RECORD is more robust than these techniques since it starts out with the
assumption that the design is already known to the attacker. Through the use of a
randomized dual-rail encoding and careful selection of split manufacturing the RECORD
process prevents hardware Trojans from directly obtaining meaningful information from
any part of the protected circuit.
Though RECORD is resistant to attacks even after the design is compromised, it
is only defined for combinational logic. It is less than ideal for sequential logic designs
as will be explored in Section 2. In a sequential circuit, the attacker has access to
information not available in a combinational design: the information created in previous
or upcoming clock cycles. As shown in subsection 2.2 this creates a vulnerability in the
RECORD process by allowing attackers to infer the random encoding bit.
Sequential RECORD is a modification of the basic RECORD design that expands
the dual rail encoding scheme to use two random bits that can change independently on
each clock cycle. A change to the split manufacturing scheme that makes use of 3D IC
technology is also proposed. These new techniques increase the difficulty to decode the
dual rail encoding and allow the RECORD concept to be used successfully in a sequential
design. The effectiveness of the Sequential RECORD method is demonstrated by
implementing it in a Data Encryption Standard (DES) circuit. The technique requires a
3.75x area overhead and 4.5x power overhead and caused a 3% impact on performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a short
review of the RECORD design process. Subsection 2.2 discusses the challenges of
utilizing RECORD in sequential designs.
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Section 3 describes the Sequential RECORD process in detail. Section 4 presents a
design example using a Data Encryption Standard circuit. Conclusions are presented in
Section 5.
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2. BACKGROUND

2.1 BACKGROUND OF RECORD
With a RECORD design the opponent must still decipher the design as with all
the DFS methods. However RECORD makes the assumption that this will be successful
and adds additional protection which knowledge of the circuit design does not overcome.
A chip designed using RECORD uses a combination of split manufacturing and
randomized dual-rail signaling to foil attackers. As seen in Figure 2.1, the outer ring is
composed of prefabricated modules that perform the dual-rail conversion and generate a
random signal. Since these sections are prefabricated (possibly years in advance) and
later attached to the outsourced logic, they are inaccessible to an attacker at the time of
fabrication. The individual chip wafers are joined using the Quilt Packaging process [16,
17].

Figure 2.1. Block overview of a RECORD chip
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Within these pre-fabricated I/O blocks the signals are converted to dual rail
signals and back to single rail at the output. Conversion is done by XORing the input bit,
x, with a randomly generated signal, r, which then becomes the second bit of the dual rail
signal, t, as shown in (1).
t  xr

(1)

This bit, r, randomly changes each time the chip is activated. The dual rail signals
represent a logic 0 as either 00 or 11. Logic 1 can be represented as either 01 or 10.
The two bits are represented by t & r in (1). The original input value, x, is
dropped. Note that the second bit, r, of the dual-rail signal is always the random signal
bit. This bit is never routed outside of the I/O blocks. Only the first bit, t, of the new
dual-rail inputs is ever routed to the inner combinational logic see Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2. Conversion of input data to dual rail

The internal combinational logic needs to be altered to accommodate the dual-rail
signaling. Any combinational function f can be converted to a dual rail function using
(2).

𝑓(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , … ) → (𝑓(𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , 𝑡3 , … ) ⊕ 𝑟)

(2)
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Further manipulations using Boolean algebra show that a dual rail encoded function can
be represented as in (3).

𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥2 ⊕ 𝑟, 𝑥3 ⊕ 𝑟, … ) ⊕ 𝑟 = 𝑟𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 1, 𝑥2 ⊕ 1, 𝑥3 ⊕ 1 … ) ⊕
(3)
1 + 𝑟̅ 𝑓((𝑥1 ⊕ 0, 𝑥2 ⊕ 0, 𝑥3 ⊕ 0 … ) ⊕ 0

̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
̅ , 𝑡2,
̅ 𝑡3̅ … ) + 𝑟̅ 𝑓 (𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , 𝑡3 … )
= 𝑟𝑓(𝑡
1

(4)

The result of these manipulations is that the combinational function is duplicated and
multiplexed with the random bit, r, used as a select signal. Each functional block is then
sent only the first rail, t, of any dual-rail converted input bits. Never the second rail, r.
This results in two outputs, f and f’, see Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3. Conceptual diagram of RECORD circuit of logic function F
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These two outputs are then routed back to the outer I/O modules where they are
re-joined by the random bit, r. The two outputs are de- muxed using the random bit as a
select signal to create output, g, which is itself in dual rail encoding with, r. Finally, g is
converted back to single rail with another XOR gate before being routed off chip. The
attacker is then presented with a design that is only ever routed with half of a randomly
generated dual-rail data signal which is meaningless without the random bit. The random
bit does not exist in the outsourced portion of the design. For a more detailed explanation
of RECORD see [7].

2.2 MOTIVATION FOR SEQUENTIAL RECORD
The RECORD design scheme adds an unprecedented protection layer beyond
traditional DFS, since it assumes that the attacker has already broken the first line of
defense. The first line being simply understanding the design. After an attacker deciphers
a RECORD design, they are presented with two outputs, f and f’, each of which is a dual
rail encoded signal. The attacker does not have any way of determining which should be
chosen since both combinational blocks are identical. Neither does the attacker know
what the random bit value is, which is required to decode the final output. Additionally,
these choices change randomly each time the circuit is activated and each chip need not
be assembled identically.
If RECORD were used directly in a sequential design, however, the attacker
would then have additional information: the two outputs, f and f’, and now a returning
signal, g, which represents the output of a register. This signal, g, can be used to infer the
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random bit value and decode the signals on any line. This concept is discussed in detail
in Section 3.2.
Furthermore, RECORD does not discuss what is to be done with the random bit
on each clock transition. Should it be stored or allowed to change? If stored, then control
logic would be required. RECORD is a generic design scheme that can be used
indiscriminately on any combinational design. It is desirable to maintain generality in
Sequential RECORD. Control logic would destroy this generality.
Sequential RECORD expands on RECORD by allowing the random bit to change
on each clock and by adding a second random bit to overcome the vulnerability
introduced by the returning signal, g.
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3. FRAMEWORK OF SEQUENTIAL RECORD

3.1 HANDLING THE RANDOM BIT CHANGES
RECORD does not discuss what to do with the random bit, r, on subsequent clock
cycles. There are two options, store it or allow it to change independently. If the
designer was to extend RECORD directly to sequential designs without altering the
RECORD method, the entire sequential design would be duplicated (registers and
combinational logic) just as the combinational function, F, in RECORD. Only one rail
of the dual rail signal would be stored in the registers on each clock cycle. The random
bit would then need to remain the same on the next cycle for the dual rail signal to still be
valid. Storing the random bit also implies additional control logic.
Imagine a simple pipeline. Each set of data would have its own random bit which
would need to be stored and then recalled at the appropriate time to decode the correct
output from the pipeline. Not only does storing the random bit add area to the prefabricated I/O blocks but it also hinders the pre-fabrication process. The control logic
would not be universal but would need to be customized to properly correlate to each
circuit. The plug and play generality of RECORD would be lost.
Sequential RECORD allows the random bit to change independently and
randomly on each clock and allows the I/O logic to remain simple and independent of the
sequential logic. To accomplish this independence, when the random second rail
changes, the data stored in the registers will be evaluated and updated to the new random
bit on each clock cycle.
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To simplify the design only the intermediate combinational logic, seen in Figure
3.1, is duplicated, as in RECORD. Then only a single, shared, set of registers is required.
The outputs of the duplicated combinational logic blocks are de-muxed, see Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.1. Standard un-altered sequential logic

Figure 3.2. Logic needed to keep the dual rail signal in synch with the random bit

Demuxing is done on each clock instead of only at completion of the calculation.
The de-muxed output is then stored in the shared set of registers. On the next clock the
output of the register must be re-indexed using XOR with the update signal based on
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whether the random bit has switched or not. This update signal is the XOR of the current
clock cycle’s random bit, r(t), and the previous clock cycles random bit, r(t-1), see (5).

update  r (t )  r (t  1)

(5)

The update process requires one additional register added to the pre-fabricated I/O to
store one random bit from the previous cycle.
If the design is laid out as specified in RECORD then each register would need to
be prefabricated as an I/O block and quilted to the outsourced core. This would quickly
overwhelm the Quilt Packaging process, since it is limited to the perimeter of the core.
Imagine a core limited design as opposed to a pad limited design. In order to keep the
random bit, r, secure, we need to modify the split manufacturing process. Instead of
using Quilt Packaging to combine the secure and insecure portions of the chip, Sequential
RECORD uses a secure top tier and 3D manufacturing to combine the two tiers using
Through Silicon Vias (TSVs) [18]. The split manufacturing will be discussed further in
Section 3.3.

3.2 A SECOND RANDOM BIT
The design can now be segregated as in RECORD keeping the random second rail
confined to the upper tier of a 3D IC process. The attacker must now try to infer the
random bit with the information available in the outsourced lower tier, as there would be
no way to directly monitor it. If the design is encoded using a single random bit, as in
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RECORD, an inserted Trojan can monitor the signals passed between tiers, f, f’ and
g(t+1). It would then be possible to infer the random bit under certain conditions.

– If f(t)=f’(t), and g(t+1)=f(t), then r has not flipped from cycle t to cycle t+1
– If f(t)=f’(t), and g(t+1)= f '(t) , then r has flipped from cycle t to cycle t+1
– If f(t)=

f '(t)

, and g(t+1)=f(t), then r(t+1)=1

– If f(t)= f '(t) , and g(t+1)=

f '(t) ,

then r(t+1)=0

Using these criteria an attacker could discover the random bit and keep track of its
changes cycle to cycle. Once the random bit is discovered the entire scheme fails.
The solution is to use an additional random bit. Using the concepts presented in
(2)-(4), the following solution can be obtained for adding a second random bit, r2, to a
function, f , see (6).

𝑓(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 … ) → 𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟1 , 𝑥2 ⊕ 𝑟2 , 𝑥3 ⊕ 𝑟1 … ) ⊕ 𝑟1

(6)

f (x1  r1 , x 2  r2 , x 3  r1 ,...)  r1 
r1r2 f (t1 , t 2 , t 3 ,...)  r1r2 f (t1 , t 2 , t 3 ,...)

(7)

 r1r2 f (t1 , t 2 , t 3 ,...)  r1r2 f (t1 , t 2 , t 3 ,...)

In this new implementation r1 and r2 are independently switching random numbers. As
seen in (7) the two random bit implementation can be represented as four identical
functions with different input vectors and outputs inverted, see Figure 3.3.
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f  f (t1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ...)  F1

f '  f (t1 , t2 , t 3 , t4 ...)  F2
f ''  f (t1 , t 2 , t3 , t 4 ...)  F3

f '''  f (t1 , t2 , t3 , t4 ...)  F4
Figure 3.3. Input vectors for each intermediate combinational block

Some of the inputs will refer to r1 and some will refer to r2, the exact combination
can be changed but here we have set half to refer to r1 and the other half to r2. The
intermediate outputs will refer to just one of the random bits. Here we have chosen r1 but
it could just as easily be r2, as determined by the physical wiring of the 4-1 multiplexer.
Figure 3.4 shows how (7) could be implemented in hardware. The combinational logic
functions F1-4, are de-muxed using the two random bits r1 and r2 as select signals before
being stored in a register. This allows the stored signal to be re-indexed against a new
random bit in the next clock cycle.

Figure 3.4. Implementation of two random bit Sequential RECORD
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The new upper tier design is shown in Figure 3.5. To re-index each bit before it is
sent back to the lower tier, the bit must be XOR’d with one of two update signals based
on random bit r1(t+1) or r2(t+1). For example, if bit 5 of the input signal was paired with r2,
bit 5 of the intermediate output vector is then referenced to r1, due to wiring of the
multiplexer. When bit 5 is read out of the register on the next clock cycle it must be reindexed since the random bit may or may not have changed. It may be re-indexed against
either r1 or r2.

Figure 3.5. Upper tier for two random bit implementation

3.3 SPLIT MANUFACTURING
As discussed in Section 3.1, the split manufacturing for Sequential RECORD will
be performed using a 3D process with a lower, outsourced, die and an upper, secure, die
joined using TSV, see Figure 3.6. The upper tier will include all of the components
previously included in the prefabricated blocks used in RECORD: random bit generator,
dual-rail generating XOR gates, multiplexers and single rail generating XOR gates. The
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upper tier will now also include all of the components found in Figure 3.5, including 4-1
multiplexers, registers and an additional random bit generator.

Figure 3.6. Conceptual data flow diagram for Sequential RECORD. Showing how data
flows between the two layers

The upper tier can be prefabricated in an array structure as seen in Figure 3.7,
where each block in the figure contains the components of Figure 3.5: the multiplexor,
register and XOR gate needed for the dual rail design. Not all the top structures need be
identical. Several variations could be used to obfuscate the design and frustrate the
attacker. Possibilities include switching the dependence of the output bits from r1 to r2,
or switching the dependence of the input bits.
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Figure 3.7. Array structure of pre-fabricated top tier

A possible layout for these standard register blocks is shown in Figure 3.8. This
layout uses 45 nm technology standard cells. Each TSV is 1 µm in diameter and the total
area of each block is 55.6 µm2.

Figure 3.8. A possible layout for the upper tier register blocks used in Figure 3.7
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3.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
Looking at the possible input/output scenarios using the same methodology
described in Section 3.2 to determine if the random bit can be inferred, see Table 3.1. By
including a second random bit the number of possible output combinations has
quadrupled and reduced the number of scenarios for direct random bit inference to 25%.
Table 3.2 shows similar results for outputs referred to r2.

Table 3.1. Possible input/output combinations and potential for discovery of r1 and r2
when Fx output is referred to r1

Table 3.2. Possible input/output combinations and potential for discovery of r1 and r2
when Fx output is referred to r2
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Using the scenarios in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, an attacker could determine the random
bit in four scenarios. However, these tables assume several things. First the attacker
must know which physical logic block is which, F1, F2, F3 and F4. As can be seen from
the tables, the order matters. The attacker must also know which bit the intermediate
outputs are being referenced to prior to being stored in the registers. This can be either r1
or r2, and is easily changed by re-wiring the select signals on the multiplexers. Finally
the attacker must know which bit the returning signal g(t+1) is referenced to.
Since the entire register block is located on a secure upper tier, each upper layer
could be different. For each register block there are 96 different permutations of input
wiring and output references. the same lower insecure wafer could be bonded to any
number of different possible upper layers, indiscriminately. Conversely, the upper tiers
can be used for any lower tier design allowing bulk manufacturing of the upper tier for
cost savings.
A different inference table is needed for each possibility and there is no way for
an attacker to know which table is needed for any given chip. The possible number of
upper tier variations is limited only by the number of registers in the total design and the
fabrication cost of an upper tier. Only a small number of upper tier variations need
actually be manufactured. The attacker would not know which ones and would need to
take all into account.
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4. DESIGN RESULTS

To demonstrate the performance of Sequential RECORD, a 64 bit Data
Encryption Standard (DES) design was implemented using this technique [19]. The
baseline design was implemented in VHDL and synthesized using a 45 nm process with
Cadence Encounter RTL Compiler v.13.10. The Sequential RECORD modifications
were performed directly to the synthesized Verilog netlist of the baseline code.
Encounter RTL Compiler provided the power and timing slack analysis. Both designs
were then laid out using Cadence Encounter RTL to GDSII v.13.23, where the areas of
the designs were measured.
The Sequential RECORD design method was synthesized and a full layout
performed. The layout is shown in Figure 4.1. The area of the core was 3.75x larger than
the baseline DES design. At first glance it might be assumed that the area overhead
should be closer to four times, given the four times duplication of the logic blocks,
however recall that the registers are not duplicated in the Sequential RECORD design
process. The simulation results are summarized in Table 4.1. Dynamic power increased
4.5x, 3.1x for leakage and 4.5x overall. A timing analysis was performed at 31 MHz.
The clock speed was chosen based on the clock speed given in the DES datasheet [19].
The slack was reduced by only 3% due to Sequential RECORD. This overhead may
seem excessive but consider the use of triple modular redundancy (TMR) which carries
3x area overhead and is a common design method used to increase reliability [20]. The
extra 0.75x area increase over TMR is a small price to pay for added security.
Also, note that the dual rail layout values include area for unnecessary
multiplexors and XOR gates that occur resulting from pre-fabrication. Due to the nature
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of the DES design there is a 64 bit input word that is held in the first bank of registers.
These register values are not operated on in subsequent clock cycles and therefore do not
need to be multiplexed and referenced back to a random bit as seen in Figure 3.5. The
synthesizer recognized that the multiplexers and XOR gates were not used and deleted
them. Since we are pre-fabricating the top layer these extra components would be
present and would contribute area overhead. The area was manually added back into the
numbers you see in the table.
Comparing Sequential RECORD to RECORD we see that Sequential RECORD
increases the area overhead over baseline from 2.3x to 3.75x or 63%. Power overhead
similarly increases from 2.8x to 4.5x or 61%.

Table 4.1. Power, Area and Slack Comparison for DES design and Sequential RECORD
DES

Baseline

Dynamic

Leakage

Pre-Layout

Post Layout

Slack

Power

Power

Area

Area

0.96 mW

0.044 mW

7,619 µm2

9,662 µm2

29.7 ns

4.35 mW

0.138 mW

28,948 µm2

36,285 µm2

28.9 ns

DES
Sequential
RECORD
DES
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Figure 4.1. Layout of DES design utilizing Sequential RECORD process
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5. CONCLUSION

We have presented Sequential RECORD, an extension to the RECORD design
process to protect hardware from data leakage induced by insertion of hardware Trojans.
Sequential RECORD extends the basic principles of RECORD, random dual-rail
signaling and split manufacturing, to sequential designs. This is done with the addition of
a second random bit and a move from Quilt Packaging to 3D manufacturing.
Experimental design analysis utilizing a DES circuit as a baseline yielded a 3.75x area
overhead and 4.5x power overhead. The timing slack was reduced only 3% from
baseline by the addition of the Sequential RECORD components. Sequential RECORD
maintains the random signaling of RECORD and its generic plug and play design
method. Sequential RECORD also greatly increases the number of design variations
thereby making decoding of a Sequential RECORD circuit difficult.
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ABSTRACT

Globalization of micro-chip fabrication has opened a new avenue of cyber-crime.
It is now possible to insert hardware Trojans directly into a chip during the manufacturing
process. To date, defensive methods have focused on detection of the Trojan circuitry or
prevention through design for security methods. One recent DFS method has attempted
to shift the focus from prevention and detection by creating ASICs that are inherently
secure and require no testing to detect Trojans. Randomized Encoding of Combinational
Logic for Resistance to Data Leakage (RECORD) and its Sequential logic variant,
present processes that can prevent hardware Trojans from leaking meaningful
information even when the entire design is known to the attacker. Both of these methods
have significant area and power overhead, apx. 4x area and 4.5x power for the sequential
version. In this paper, the fundamental ideas of RECORD are re-imagined to create a
Time Division Multiplexed version of the RECORD design process which reduces area
overhead by 63% and power by 56%. This TDM concept is further refined to allow
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) products and IP cores to be safely operated from a
separate chip. These new methods trade off latency (5.3x for TDM and 3.9x for COTS)
and energy use to accomplish the area and power savings and achieve greater security
than the original RECORD process.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Detection and prevention of hardware Trojan attacks has become a major concern
for any company wishing to outsource its hardware manufacturing. The threat that a
hardware Trojan could lie dormant on a new chip for years before crippling it, is a very
real one. These Trojans could also steal encryption keys, passwords or other sensitive
information, compromising the entire enterprise. These data leakage Trojans can leak
secret information out through Wi-Fi [1] or even through the power signature itself [2].
Detecting hardware Trojans has proven very difficult if not impossible. Some Trojans
have been demonstrated to successfully operate with as little as five transistors [3]. Most
current methods of defense would be ineffective against such an attack. Of course this
problem extends beyond custom ASIC designs and the firms creating them. Most
companies buy commercial chips and are in no way involved in the design and
production processes. Protecting a Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) chip has so far
been a mostly un-explored area of hardware Trojan defense methods.
Current methods of detecting hardware Trojans after production involve runtime
monitoring and post-manufacture testing [4]. Runtime monitoring and post-manufacture
testing rely on identifying the differences in chip operation introduced by the Trojan
circuit. These methods depend on the tester’s ability to trigger the Trojan circuit so the
effects of the Trojan can be measured. In order for runtime monitoring and postmanufacture testing to work a golden chip is usually needed so that there is something to
compare the manufactured chip to. Simulation of the chip functionality is generally not
accurate enough to show the very small changes introduced by the additional Trojan
circuitry. How the golden chip is to be produced is left to the reader. Neither of these
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broad categories would be relevant for a third party company buying the chip
commercially.
A more reliable method of protection is to design the chip for security from the
beginning. The concept of Design For Security (DFS) encompasses many possible ideas
and methods; Obfuscation[5,6], Layout Camouflaging[5,7], and Split Manufacturing[5,8]
for example. However, obfuscation and layout camouflaging are both susceptible to
reverse engineering [9] given enough time and effort. Split manufacturing is susceptible
if multiple fabrication runs are used, which is often the case [10]. This paper focuses on
a new DFS method known as RECORD (Randomized Encoding of Combinational Logic
for Resistance to Data Leakage) [11] and more specifically the Sequential RECORD
variant [12] which can protect sensitive information from being leaked even when the full
design is known to the attacker and multiple fabrication runs are needed.
Sequential RECORD took the initial concept of RECORD, which was only
specified for combinational logic, and extended it to sequential circuits. The general idea
uses two randomly generated numbers to temporarily encode incoming data into a dual
rail signal. Wherein, the random numbers represent one of the rails. Through Boolean
manipulation combined with split manufacturing, the Sequential RECORD process is
able to effectively prevent any data leakage Trojans from capturing meaningful data from
anywhere on the chip. This process does not try to detect or even prevent hardware
Trojans on the chip. There is no longer any need. Any data captured by the attacks
would be meaningless.
The Sequential RECORD process suffers from two drawbacks. First the
RECORD algorithm increases the area by almost 4x and the power by about 4.5x. And
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since it is a DFS method it must be designed into the chip from the start making it useless
for COTS applications. In this paper two modifications to the RECORD process are
presented. The first, Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) RECORD, will show how the
RECORD process can be modified to reduce the area and power overhead by 63% and
56%, respectively, at the expense of only processing time and total energy used.
Secondly, a scheme to use the RECORD concepts off chip to allow safe operation of
COTS products is presented. This method is shown to work effectively without
modification of the COTS product and can be implemented on an FPGA or other
processor which may already be present in the design with approximately 4x increase in
processing time.
The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 includes a discussion
of the Sequential RECORD design process. Section 3 describes the TDM RECORD
modified process. Section 4 shows how RECORD concepts can be used to safely operate
infected COTS chips. Section 5 will show the experimental results and Section 6 will
conclude.
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2. BACKGROUND OF SEQUENTIAL RECORD

The Sequential RECORD design process is itself a modification of the initial
RECORD design process which allows the concepts to be used successfully on sequential
designs. For a full discussion of the RECORD process see [11].
The first step in the Sequential RECORD process is to create dual rail
representations of the incoming data vectors. The conversion is done by XORing the
input bits, x, with one of two randomly generated signals, r1 & r2, which then becomes
the second bit of the dual rail signal,t, as shown in (1). The exact order of which bit is
XOR’d with which random signal is up to the designer and can be changed chip to chip.

𝑡 = 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑟1 or 𝑡 = 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑟2

(1)

The bits ,r1 & r2, randomly change on each clock. The dual rail signals represent logic 0
as either 00 or 11. Logic 1 can be represented as either 01 or 10. The two bits are
represented by t & r in (1). The original input value, x, is dropped. Note that the second
bit, r, of the dual-rail signal is always the random signal bit. This bit is never routed to
the sequential logic. Only the first bit, t, of the new dual-rail inputs is ever routed to the
inner combinational logic see Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1. Conversion of input data to dual rail
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The new input, t, vectors are routed to the logic according to the following
equations. Equation 2 shows how the original function f can be converted to dual rail
with two random bits, r1 & r2. Equation 3, shows how the concept can be implemented in
real hardware after some simple Boolean manipulation.

𝑓(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 … ) → 𝑓(𝑥1 ⊕ 𝑟1 , 𝑥2 ⊕ 𝑟2 , 𝑥3 ⊕ 𝑟1 … ) ⊕ 𝑟1

(2)

f (x1  r1 , x 2  r2 , x 3  r1 ,...)  r1 
r1r2 f (t1 , t 2 , t 3 ,...)  r1r2 f (t1 , t 2 , t 3 ,...)

(3)

 r1r2 f (t1 , t 2 , t 3 ,...)  r1r2 f (t1 , t 2 , t 3 ,...)

Equation 3, describes four identical functions each being sent a slightly altered
version of the same input vector. The two random bits are used as select signals to
demux the four outputs and select the correct output. Note that the output selected by the
de-muxing process is still in dual rail representation, with r1 in this case. The second
random bit could be used instead with simple reworking of the equations. Figure 2.2
shows what these equations would look like in hardware.

Figure 2.2. Implementation of two random bit Sequential RECORD
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Since the random bits are allows to change independently on each clock cycle a
method to keep track of the changes and update the, t, signals accordingly is needed.
First, it can be seen in Figure 2.2 that the registers are not duplicated only the
intermediate logic. The intermediate logic ouputs are de-muxed according to (3) and the
output stored as normal in the register. On the next clock cycle the output is read out and
the re-indexed against one of the two random bit signals. Since the output of the register
is already in a dual rail representation with r1, the r1(t-1) signal is needed to create an
update signal, (4). The new value, g, can be indexed against either random bit at the
designers discretion before being sent on to the next set of four intermediate logic blocks,
see Figure 2.3.

update  r (t )  r (t  1)

(4)

Figure 2.3. Circuitry needed for each register to update the random bit changes
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The last major step in the Sequential RECORD process is to segregate the design
into an upper and lower tier for 3D manufacturing. This is done to keep the random bits
secret and to allow for multiple variations of the same chip to be produced
simultaneously. The contents of Figure 2.3, are placed on the upper tier along with the
random bit generator/s. Figure 2.3 can now be referred to as a register block which can
be laid out in an array structure, Figure 2.4. The upper tier is then connected with
Through Silicon Vias (TSV) to the lower tier. The lower tier contains only the four
copies of all the intermediate logic. This lower tier can now be outsourced. The upper
tier is generic. These register blocks are compatible with any design as long as there are
enough registers. The upper tier should be pre-fabricated so that the exact logic it will be
bonded with is unknown and it should be done in a secure environment or at the very
least a totally unaffiliated facility than the lower tier. Not all the top structures need be
identical. Several variations could be used to obfuscate the design and frustrate the
attacker. Possibilities include switching the dependence of the output bits from r1 to r2,
or switching the dependence of the input bits.

Figure 2.4. Array structure of pre-fabricated top tier
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The final fully assembled design is represented by Figure 2.5, which shows the data
flow from chip input, between the layers, and the final output routed off chip.

Figure 2.5. Conceptual data flow diagram for Sequential RECORD. Showing how data
flows between the two layers

A design prepared using the Sequential RECORD method resists data leakage
very effectively, however there are a very small percentage of cases in which an attacker
could de-code the design with a Trojan placed on the lower tier. Table 2.1 shows the
possible combinations of outputs from the lower tier (F1, F2, F3 and F4) and the
returning input to the lower tier, g, which would allow the attacker to infer the random
bit. Note these five signals are the only signals an attacker would have access to on the
lower tier. This equates to 25% of cases in which the random bit could be inferred.
However this is not as simple as it first appears. First the attacker must know which
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physical logic block is which, F1, F2, F3 and F4. As can be seen from the table, the order
matters. The attacker must also know which bit the intermediate outputs are being
referenced to prior to being stored in the registers. This can be either r1 or r2, and is
easily changed by re-wiring the select signals on the multiplexers. Finally the attacker
must know which bit the returning signal g(t+1) is referenced to.

Table 2.1. Possible input/output combinations and potential for discovery of r1 and r2
when Fx output is referred to r1

Since the entire register block is located on a secure upper tier, the upper layer
should be designed to take advantage of the different possibilities. For each register block
there are 96 different permutations of input wiring and output references. The same
lower, insecure, wafer could be bonded to any number of different possible upper layers,
indiscriminately. Additionally, the upper tiers can be used for any lower tier design
allowing bulk manufacturing of the upper tier for cost savings. A different inference
table is needed for each possibility and there is no way for an attacker to know which
table is needed for any given chip. The possible number of upper tier variations is limited
only by the number of registers in the total design and the fabrication cost of an upper
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tier. Furthermore, only a small number of upper tier variations need actually be
manufactured. The attacker would not know which ones had been used and would need
to take all into account. For a much more thorough explanation of Sequential RECORD
please refer to [12].
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3.

TIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING

RECORD provides excellent protection for custom ASIC designs both for
combinational or sequential circuits. It does however still carry large area and power
overhead, approximately 3.75x area and 4.5x power for Sequential RECORD.
RECORD also benefits from a very simple and generic implementation that can be easily
adapted to any design with no circuit specific logic or control. Consequently, when area
or power is at a premium a different approach is needed. Time Division Multiplexing
offers a perfect solution to reduce the power and area overhead. The Sequential
RECORD process contains four copies of the same logic. This serves two purposes; it
allows for quick parallel processing of the four input vectors and helps to confuse
attackers. TDM RECORD eliminates the duplication while at the same time opening up
possibilities for an even more secure protection scheme.
The intermediate combinational logic is copied four times and operated on in
parallel. The only difference between the blocks is that each block of logic is sent a
different input vector. In TDM RECORD, the four variant input combinations can be
sent in sequence to just one copy of the intermediate logic instead of four. The outputs of
the intermediate logic are then stored in one of four register blocks before being demuxed to determine the final correct output.
The register blocks are not the same as in Sequential RECORD. In Sequential
RECORD each register stores the de-muxed output of the four input vectors before being
re-indexed to the random bit on the next clock, Figure 2.3. In TDM RECORD all four
outputs are not available in the same clock cycle. It now takes four periods to accumulate
all four outputs. During this time the random bit would be changing on each clock. After
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the first output is ready the subsequent outputs would be indexed against different
random bits.
Even if all the different random bits were stored for reference the de-muxing
process would become invalid. In order to overcome this issue, a slight modification of
the process is needed. Now each intermediate output vector, g1-4, will be stored until all
four input vectors have completed. Then the four stored outputs will be de-muxed with
the two random bits as select signals, as before. The new output will then be re-indexed
against two newly generated random bits before being sent on to the next set of
intermediate logic, Figure 3.1. This means that the random bits must be stored for four
clocks cycles instead of changing on each cycle. It also means that control logic is
needed to orchestrate when new random bits are needed and into which register block the
intermediate outputs, g1-4, are placed.

Figure 3.1. Registers for each round of TDM RECORD and the re-indexing logic
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The entire process is illustrated in Figure 3.2. At time, T, the incoming data
vector is converted to dual rail representation with r1 and r2. The new input bits, t, are
then sent to the first logic block. The output is then stored in register block 1. In time,
T+1, the same input bits, t, are sent back to the same logic block but with some of the
inputs inverted as described in (3). The outputs are stored in register block 2. This
process is repeated two more times with the input bits, t, being inverted or not inverted
according to (3). Finally in T+4, the register blocks are de-muxed using r1 and r2 as
select signals. Here r1 and r2 have not been allowed to change from cycle to cycle but
have been stored since, T. Then, in T+5 the random bits are allowed to change, the
output of the register block is updated and the process begins again.

Figure 3.2. Conceptual data flow diagram for TDM RECORD process. Showing the first
round of data processing
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The security of the random bits is maintained with split manufacturing. The
upper tier would contain the control logic, the input multiplexers, registers with XOR
gates, output registers and final de-mux and the bottom tier contains all of the
intermediate logic. Storing the random bits for four clock cycles does nothing to
compromise the security. An attacker would still need to wait until all four input data
vectors have processed before attempting to infer the random bit, at which time the bit
would change just as in Sequential RECORD.
The complexity of the control logic is determined by the complexity of the
application but it does eliminate the generic application of RECORD and Sequential
RECORD. While at the same time opening up two very important options. First,
Sequential RECORD was resistant to attackers inferring the random bits by reading the
signals moving between upper and lower tiers. However, remote possibilities still existed
if the attacker knew which combinational block was receiving which input vector, which
input bits were indexed against which random bits and finally the indexing of the
returning register outputs. By making use of the random number generator/s the control
logic can randomly change the order in which the input vectors are presented to the logic.
For example, the first iteration could present the input vectors in normal order (1,2,3,4)
but the next iteration could be (2,3,1,4) and so on. By doing this the inference table
found in Table 2.1 is rendered useless.
Secondly to further frustrate attackers the number of random bits can be
increased. Adding a third random bit was previously infeasible due to the excessive area
and power overhead. Now, that third random bit would increase the number of input
vector variations to eight but at a very small cost to additional area and power. Only four

75

additional register blocks and alterations to the control logic are needed. At the same
time greatly increasing the number of possible dual rail input permutations and upper tier
permutations.
The cost of the TDM RECORD process is time. Latency is increased by a
minimum of 5x or 9x in the case of the three random bit option. Design time also
increases, the TDM RECORD concept must be designed into the chip from the beginning
and custom control is needed for each design. Finally, while power does decrease
compared to Sequential RECORD overall energy usage increases.
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4. COTS APPLICATION

RECORD in all its variations provides excellent protection against hardware
Trojan attacks. However, they are applicable only to custom ASIC chips. QuiltPackaging [13], used in the original RECORD process, and 3D manufacturing are not
cheap. The cost of manufacturing a RECORD or Sequential RECORD design would be
many times the cost of a standard chip. This may by acceptable in certain cases but may
also be cost prohibitive. Many applications, even military ones, are moving to COTS
chips to meet specifications and budget. These chips are even more susceptible to
hardware Trojan injection since there may not be any hardware security plan in mind
when they are designed. A recent paper [14] has identified commercial parts as the
number one area needing research and a solution for preventing hardware Trojans
attacks. The TDM RECORD process presents an opportunity to do just that.
TDM RECORD requires a custom ASIC solutions since the design must be
segregated into two tiers for the 3D manufacturing process and the internal registers must
be moved to the upper tier. This of course will not work for a COTS chip which is
already manufactured. A way is needed to interface with the COTS chip in such a way
that any data leakage Trojans already present on the chips will be ineffective. The
solution is to move the TDM RECORD control logic to a separate chip, such as an
FPGA.
The registers on the COTS chip cannot be moved nor can they be individually
accessed in most cases. Consequently the TDM process of injecting the appropriate data
vectors into each intermediate logic block is no longer applicable. The second chip of the
COTS RECORD process must now send each of the four input data vectors to the COTS
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chip and wait for the chip to fully complete its operation, Figure 4.1. In the case of a
DES chip, this would take sixteen cycles to produce a final encoded output. After which
that output would be stored in the control chip and the next of four input vectors would
be sent. While this is going on, only one set of random bits is used and stored on the
control chip. There is no need to ever send them to the COTS chip so they are safe from
detection. When all four vectors have been processed, the control chip will de-mux using
the random bits as select signals and convert back to single rail before sending the final
output to its original destination.

Figure 4.1. COTS RECORD data flow between two chips

The COTS RECORD process is perhaps the most secure application of the
RECORD design scheme. At no time does a hardware Trojan present on the COTS chip
have any way to monitor or infer the random bits. Since the Trojan has been on the chip
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since manufacture there is also no way for it to adapt and recognize that the RECORD
process is in use. It will continue to leak data as before, however now the data will be
only one half of a dual rail signal. The control chip can make use of the TDM RECORD
options to mix up the input order of the input data vectors. The designers can add as
many random bits to the process as desired. Again, the cost of the COTS RECORD
process is mostly in processing time, and design time. The additional board space of the
control chip may also be a concern, especially in mobile devices, as well as the additional
power requirements of that control chip. When the design requires the use of a
proprietary COTS chip or even IP core, the COTS RECORD process provides an
excellent method of safely operating the commercial product.
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5. DESIGN RESULTS

The TDM and COTS RECORD processes were both implemented in VHDL to
confirm functionality and evaluate impacts to area, power and performance. The TDM
process was implemented on a 64 bit Data Encryption Standard (DES) design [15] for
direct comparison to Sequential RECORD and simulated using Modelsim Altera edition
v.10.1d. The design was synthesized with Cadence Encounter RTL Compiler v.13.10
and Cadence Generic Process Design Kit (GPDK) 45nm to obtain power estimates. The
design was then fully laid out using Cadence Encounter RTL to GDSII v.13.23 to obtain
an area estimate. The COTS RECORD process was implemented in hardware on an
Altera DE2 development board featuring a Cyclone II FPGA. The control code written
in VHDL was synthesized using Quartus II 13.0 sp.1. The VHDL code was also
synthesized in Cadence Encounter for more direct comparisons with Sequential
RECORD and TDM RECORD also using the Cadence GPDK 45nm technology library.
The TDM RECORD design of the 64 bit DES was found to have an area of
15,440 µm2 compared to 7,619 µm2 for the original unaltered DES circuit. This is an
area increase of 2.02x. Comparing that to the Sequential RECORD design area for the
same DES circuit, 28,948 µm2, TDM RECORD reduces the area overhead by 63%. The
power usage for TDM RECORD at 31Mhz has increased by 1.96x over standard DES
and has reduced the power overhead of Sequential RECORD by 56%. Table 5.1
summarizes the power and area overhead of TDM RECORD.
The cost of TDM record, as stated previously, is in performance or latency. The
original DES design requires 6.72ms to complete its testbench. The new TDM RECORD
version takes 35.7ms to complete the same test bench at 31Mhz. Resulting in an increase
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Table 5.1. Power and Area Comparison for TDM RECORD
Standard DES

Sequential RECORD

TDM RECORD DES

DES
Area µm2

7619

28,948

15,440

Dynamic Power, mW

0.96

4.35

1.88

Leakage Power, mW

0.044

0.138

0.097

of 5.3x as was expected in the data flow of Figure 3.2. The additional 0.3x is due to
processing time needed for the Sequential RECORD process, such as converting to dual
rail, re-indexing and selecting the appropriate data to pass to the next logic stage, etc.
Total energy consumption would also increase since the same operation must be
completed four times to get the same final result. For example, standard DES would
consume 3.6 J of energy per operation, Sequential RECORD DES, 15.71 J for the same
operation and TDM DES apx. 37.7 J.
The latency overhead could be further reduced with optimization of the source
code. For example, since the control logic knows what the random bits are it could
perform a ‘smart’ selection of the intermediate logic outputs and simply drop the unneeded data. This would have the dual effect of reducing power and area. Latency
would also be reduced since the steps in time T+4 in Figure 3.2 would no longer be
needed. It may however open up the circuit to power analysis attacks since it would most
likely be easy to see which round used more power by storing the data. Further analysis
is planned to explore the effect of power analysis on RECORD circuits. Regardless,
given today’s high clock speeds, often in the Ghz range, this increase in latency should
have minimal impact on all but the highest performance applications.
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To illustrate the COTS RECORD concept, the FPGA was used as the control chip
to operate an Intel 8294A Data Encryption Unit, which represented the Trojan infected
COTS chip. The Intel 8294A implements the National Bureau of Standards information
processing encryption standard [16,17] more commonly known as DES. This chip was
used extensively in banking and other transactions well into the 1990’s. The FPGA was
loaded with custom logic to control the 8294A. The 8294A was sent the four RECORD
input data vectors and it returned four dual rail encoded output vectors, Figure 4.1. The
8294A was never ‘aware’ of the fact that the input data was dual rail encoded and it also
never saw the random bits. The dual rail encoded outputs from the 8294A were then demuxed on the FPGA and converted back to single rail before being output from the
FPGA. Figure 5.1 shows a picture of the actual setup.

8294A

Figure 5.1. Experiment setup showing Altera DE2 development board and Intel 8294A
with level shifting interface chips
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This real hardware implementation serves not only to demonstrate COTS
RECORD but also is the first real hardware implementation of the Sequential RECORD
concept. The area requirements are broken down in Table 5.2. The COTS RECORD
control logic, which includes a Trivium based random number generator [18,19],
increased the 8294A control logic by 2.55x on the Cyclone II. The random number
generator (RNG) itself is quite large and other smaller random number generators may be
available. Control logic power has increased by 5.3x.
Again, the cost of COTS RECORD is in latency. Processing time was measured
with an HP54645D oscilloscope. The standard control logic without RECORD measured
44ms to complete the DES operation process. The COTS RECORD control logic took
172ms to complete the same operation, an increase of 3.9x. The designer must also
consider the extra space and cost of an additional chip on the board. However, in some
instances the COTS RECORD control could be integrated into a pre-existing
microcontroller, FPGA or processor, greatly reduce the additional cost and space.

Table 5.2. Comparison of Area for COTS RECORD
8294A Control Logic
COTS RECORD Control

RNG

Area FPGA, logic units

563

1436

416

Area from layout, µm2

2368

8394

2532

Dynamic Power, µW

18.67

98.3

33.67

Leakage Power, µW

0.044

0.175

0.07
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6. CONCLUSION

Two modifications to the Sequential RECORD design process have been
explored. Both offer area and power savings over the original Sequential RECORD
process. First TDM RECORD utilizes time division multiplexing concepts to reduce the
area of a Sequential RECORD design by 63% and the power consumption by 56% in the
example DES circuit, at the small cost of 5.3x increased latency and total energy
consumption. At the same time giving the designer greater flexibility to frustrate
potential attacks by randomizing the order of input vector operation and even increasing
the number of random bits.
COTS RECORD has presented a method to simply and safely operate potentially
infected COTS products, believed to be a first in hardware Trojan defense. The COTS
RECORD process splits the RECORD concept into two chips and results in an area
increase of 2.55x and a power increase of 5.3x for the control logic. All while increasing
latency by only 3.9x in the example circuit. COTS RECORD also gives the designer the
option to easily increase the number of random bits and to randomize the order of input
data operation. These options, TDM and COTS, allow both the ASIC designer and the
systems integrator simple and effective options to safely utilize their designs.
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SECTION

2. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

2.1 CONCLUSIONS
Current methods of hardware Trojan defense focus on either detecting the Trojan
after production or preventing it from being inserted, all with varying degrees of success.
All of the current methods suffer from some key weakness. This dissertation has
presented a new way of looking at hardware defense by shifting the paradigm from
“detection/prevention” approach to a don’t care state. In what is believed to be a first for
hardware Trojan defense, the concepts explored here can prevent data leakage even when
the full design is known to the attacker. Three papers were presented which developed
this idea.
The first paper, RECORD, defined a method by which combinational logic
circuits could be altered to prevent data leakage Trojans from capturing meaningful data
on chip. The RECORD method first utilizes a randomly generated number to dual rail
encode the incoming data bits. These new signals are then split and only one half of the
signal is operated on by the combinational logic. Further Boolean manipulation led to
duplication of the original combinational logic which allowed the dual rail signal to be
processed. The method was implemented on an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Substitution Box (Sbox) [15] circuit and synthesized with a 45 nm process. The design
incurred a 2.28x-2.33x area overhead and 1.7x-2.24x power overhead. Impact to
performance was only 0.06x increase in latency. It is expected that as larger designs are
used with the RECORD process, the overhead will approach 2x. The increase in area and
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power is acceptable when compared to other, commonly utilized, reliability methods such
as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), which requires 3x area overhead. It is expected
that highly sensitive applications will be more concerned with security than size and
power consumption.
The RECORD process has a lower bound on area of approximately 2x. The area
cannot be less than that since the original circuit has been duplicated. The precise value
of the area overhead will approach 2x as the size of the original circuit increases. The
increase that derives from the extra RECORD circuitry, XOR gates, multiplexors,
inverters etc., will then be minimized.
The second paper described how the RECORD concepts could be successfully
used on sequential logic. Sequential RECORD expanded the Boolean equations of
RECORD to include two random bits. This in turn required quadrupling the intermediate
combinational logic and adding update logic to the registers. The design scheme moved
away from Quilt Packaging to 3D split manufacturing to protect the random bit. To
demonstrate this process, a Data Encryption Standard (DES) [16] circuit was simulated
using the Sequential RECORD design process. The 45nm design showed an increase in
area of 3.75x and an increase in power of 4.5x at 31Mhz. The Sequential RECORD
process added increased protection by increasing the possible dual rail combination and
by utilizing the split 3D process. The permutations of final assembled chips are limited
only by the total number of registers in the design.
The random number generator could present an upper bound for overall clock
speed of the design. The sequential RECORD process adds little in the way of additional
circuitry, with the exception of the random number generators. The random number
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generators can be relatively large and slow. Whichever random number generator the
designer chooses should be capable of generating two new random numbers on each
clock at the required clock speed and should be capable of generating numbers that are
difficult to guess, for example by selecting a seed which depends on some physical
parameter and using a long random number sequence, or selecting the random numbers
based on a physical random process.
The final paper presented two new ideas to address the shortcomings of RECORD
and Sequential RECORD. The first was the TDM RECORD process which drastically
reduced area and power consumption, by 63% and 56% respectively over Sequential
RECORD. This was accomplished by creating custom control logic to feed each input
bit vector to a single logic block in turn, instead of operating the input vectors in parallel.
The resulting circuit operated at 5.3x slower latency compared to the Sequential
RECORD design. The TDM process was simulated utilizing the same DES design as
Sequential RECORD for direct comparisons.
The COTS RECORD process was presented last. Its key contribution is to allow
previously manufactured chips to be utilized safely without any alteration. The COTS
process breaks out the control logic of TDM onto a separate chip which then sends each
input vector to the commercial chip in turn. The commercial chip, and any Trojan that
may be on it, is never aware that the input data it is receiving is dual rail encoded. The
concept was implemented on real hardware utilizing an Altera DE2 development board as
the control chip and an Intel 8294A data encryption unit as the ‘infected’ chip. The
control logic on the FPGA showed an increased area of 2.55x and increased power of
5.3x over the baseline 8294A control logic. The cost to the overall system though is
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really in latency which increased by 3.9x from 44ms to 172ms to complete the DES
operation. This is a small price to pay to open up the opportunity to safely utilize the
COTS marketplace in secure environments.

2.2 FUTURE WORK
The RECORD design process can benefit from further investigations into
optimizing the choice of dual rail input bits. Each of the RECORD design options
include numerous choices on which input bits to convert to dual rail and which inputs are
converted using which random bits. Paper I includes extensive data on these options.
The TDM and COTS processes also open up the door to utilizing more than two random
bits. Developing a process or algorithm to determine the optimum combination for
reduced area and power for a given circuit would be very useful. Also needed would be
finding the optimum tradeoff between latency and increased randomness of any extra
random bits. These options could be explored using a hill climber technique or a
specially constructed neural net.
The effect of the 3D manufacturing process on overall area has not been explored.
The area overhead presented in Papers II and III is simply add in the increased area of the
upper tier as if it were all incorporated into a single die. In reality, the upper tier would
be on top of the outsourced lower tier and would not take up as much overall area in the
final chip design. This is especially true for TDM RECORD since the lower tier contains
no duplication. The area overhead may be significantly reduced when these effects are
thoroughly characterized.
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Design time and effort can become an issue for very large sequential designs.
Ideally the RECORD process would be implemented from the start of the circuit design
and incorporated directly into the VHDL or Verilog code. This may not be possible in
many cases, and the process of converting a traditional design so it can be used with the
RECORD process can be quite tedious if the RECORD designer is working from an
already completed chip. Therefore, implementation of any of the RECORD processes
should be automated. The best place for such an automation algorithm to start would be
the final netlist. The automated process could then easily see what modules should be
duplicated or quadrupled. The automated process could also easily identify and segregate
all of the internal registers, moving them to a new module which would then become the
secure upper tier. Automating the conversion process is not expected to be difficult.
The RECORD process is believed to be secure however, a concerted effort should
be made to ‘break’ the RECORD process from the point of view of a hardware Trojan.
Since this method claims only to resist data leakage hardware Trojans that type of Trojan
should be used to try to leak meaningful data from a RECORD design. Full knowledge
of the chip design should be made available to the attackers, or ‘red team’.
An analysis of the RECORD processes’ resistance to side channel power analysis
attacks, such as Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [17], would also be very interesting.
DPA and its variants look for patterns in the power signature of a chip to determine the
data that is being processed. It is a different kind of attack from hardware Trojans but
equally damaging.
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At first glance, it would seem that the RECORD processes would provide some
defense against these attacks given the randomization of the internal signaling. Further
investigation into DPA and other side channel attacks is worth studying.
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APPENDIX

STEP BY STEP IMPLEMENTATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR SEQUENTIAL
RECORD

The following is a step by step instruction set for implementing a Sequential
RECORD version of a pre-existing design. When a designer is starting from scratch with
a design, the RECORD concepts should be written into the hardware description. The
split manufacturing, either Quilt Packaging or 3D, will still have to be implemented
manually during layout.
1- Synthesize the design using the desired technology library to obtain a netlist.
2- Edit the netlist by creating a new top level module. This module will contain all
of the registers (flip flops) in the design.
3- Route all inputs and outputs through the new module. Any sub-modules will now
be called from here.
4- Move ALL registers from the lower sub-modules to the new top modules. Verify
connectivity to the sub-modules and confirm the circuit still functions properly.
5- Add a random number generator of your choice to the top module.
6- Now begin implementation of the RECORD process. First take all incoming data
bits and convert them to dual rail with XOR gates. You may choose which bits
are indexed to either r1 or r2. The inputs to each gate are the input bit, x, and
either r1 or r2. You will end up with a new input vector of variable t.
7- Take the first sub-module, formerly the top level module, and create four
instances of it.
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8- The t vector will be routed as inputs to each of the four instances. Remember that
each instance will receive a different version of t inputs. The easiest way to do
this is to create a ‘t not’ vector by inverting t. Then simply select the required bits
from either t or t not and send them to the appropriate instance. So, the first
instance gets all t inputs. The next gets even bits inverted. The third gets odd bits
inverted and the last gets all bits inverted. See figure 3.3 on page 47.
9- Take the outputs of the four instances and invert the third and fourth output
vectors.
10- Route the outputs from the first two instances and the inverted outputs of the
third and fourth to a four-to-one multiplexor. This must be done for each bit. For
example, a 64 bit output requires 64 multiplexors.
11- This step is very important. Make sure you understand how your multiplexors
are wired and function. Wire r1 and r2 as select signals. Wire the multiplexor so
that ‘r1=0, r2=0’ selects the first instance, ‘r1=0, r2=1’ selects the second, ‘r1=1,
r2=0’ selects the third and ‘r1=1, r2=1’ selects the fourth. If r1 is the most
significant select signal bit then the input to the register will be referenced to r1.
If you switch the bits then the de-muxed register input will be referenced to r2.
12- Wire the mux output to the appropriate register.
13- Create update signals. First store the previous clock cycle random bit that you
chose as the de-muxed reference bit in step 11. XOR that signal with the current
cycle r1 and r2 to create two update signals.
14- On each register, send the output to an XOR gate as one of the inputs and the
other input is the update signal of your choice. Make sure not to just use one of
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the update signals. Mix it up so that some bits use the r1 reference and the others
use r2.
15- Create an inverted version of the vector you created in step 14.
16- Route the data to the next set of quadrupled sub-modules, just as in step 8.
17- Repeat until the entire circuit has been processes.
18- When the final stage data returns from the final set of quadrupled sub-modules,
de-mux with four to one multiplexors as in step 11. The next step depends on the
design. If the data is routed directly off chip, then all output bits must be XOR’d
again with the appropriate random bit, see step 11, to convert back to single rail.
If the data will be stored for multiple clock cycles then XOR with the appropriate
random bit before storing in the register. This way the final output data will be in
single rail and will not need to be continually re-indexed.
19- Create the layout making sure to keep all of the top module information on the
upper tier.
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